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Abstract: 
Although various studies are made from various perspectives on the contemporary Chinese 
corruptions’ structures, causes and counter-measures, no historical research has been done on 
how succession of empowered zhong and xiao and deviation from ren and yi and other 
traditional Chinese values impinge on communitarian corruptions. Based on Foucault’s 
conceptual formation approach,  the author makes a historical survey of the conceptual and 
practical relationship between Chinese traditional ethics and CPC’s cadre moral requirements 
and finds that although CPC tries its best to substitute Marxism for feudalism, it fails to 
suffocate the morphologically mutant succession of the Trinity of Sanwang Zhuyi, patriarchal 
clan ideals and political Confucian ideas centering around zhong and xiao, which is highly 
possible for some officials’ loyalty to the Party to metamorphose into personal attachment to a 
super power or political oligarchies inducing bossism and solid networks for communitarian 
corruptions on a large scale.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Since China’s economic reform in the early 1980s, according to Yang (2014), more and more 
corrupt officials have been punished, on which scholars have never stopped their researches.  
The first category of researches tends to have a comprehensive description of the scales, fields, 
types, characteristics and tendencies of corruption cases.   
According to Yang (2014), one hundred and eighty-one provincial and ministerial level 
officials who used to settle into central and state institutions and local governments have been 
investigated and punished from 1986 to 2014. The state-level institutions include the National 
People’s Congress,  Committee of Political Science and Law under  the 
CPC Central Committee, the Supreme Court, Central Military Commission, National 
Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Ministry of Railways, 
Ministry of Public Security, National Development and Reform Commission and state-owned 
banks, communication and oil companies. Local corruptions are mainly concentrated in those 
developed provinces such as Guangdong and those rich in natural resources such as Shanxi and 
Sichuan. The Blueprint of Combating Corruption and Building a Clean Government (2014) 
issued by China Social Academy lists  a total number of 182,038 Party members with various 
punishment from the nation-wide inspective and supervisory institutions over discipline in 2013; 
from January to June, 2014, 83,000. (Li , 2014) These corrupt officials in legislative, judicial, 
administrative institutions and state enterprises in control of national veins swallow millions or 
billions of RMB by weaving various communitarian networks. (Yang, 2014) Based on an 
evaluation of latency period of corruption, number of newly occurring corruption cases and 
cumulative number of cases adopted by current empirical analysis of corruption, Guo 
(2008:349-364) presents new evidence on the characteristics and trends of corruption and the 
relation with China's economic transition. 
The second type of literature tends to discover the relationship between corruptions and social 
transition, administrative reform, economic structural changes and chaos of values.  
Wederman (2004:895-921) draws together data from the Party discipline inspection system, the 
state supervisory system and the judicial system to chart not only overall trends in malfeasance 
and corruption but also those in the number of major cases involving senior cadres, and the 
amounts of corrupt monies. He argues that intensified corruption raises important questions 
about the link between reform deepening and corruption intensification, and economic 
consequences. Ko & Weng (2012:718-740) evaluate how the recent changes including progress 
of market economy, advent of a merit-based civil service system, improvement of budgeting 
and auditing system, fiscal recentralization and better monitoring of local governments' 
activities and progress in anti-corruption regulation and enforcement have led to structural 
changes in Chinese corruption. Their empirical analyses reveal that administrative reform 
leading to a decrease in the number of corruption cases related to the internal administrative 
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process (embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds) but failing to stop bribery 
aggravation suggests a transition from an administrative issue to a private–public transactional 
problem.  
Zhu(2011), based on theories of equity and public choices, argues for deepening reforms of 
equity, constructing rational market and regularizing governmental behaviors are essential 
measures to curb Chinese corruptions because latent defect of administration, excessive 
intervention and deficient restriction of power are the chief culprits. Fan(2012), despite of 
taking public choice theory as Zhu(2011) does, argues for a poor salary for those critical 
positions, as well as intensification of corruption culture and collapse of socio-political system, 
is one of the most important factors to corruptions since it is understandable for a man to pursue 
for maximizing his own interests. Li &Zhu(2009:40-44) argue that corruptions root in the 
conflicts between desire and resources, rapacity and reality and man itself. The strong will to 
possess more than physically needed is strengthened by monopoly and abusing public power. 
The more powerful a man is, the more likely for him to be corrupt.  
According to Zhang(2007),relevant chaos of ideas and values as well as insufficient restriction 
of powers, and economic and social transitions are the roots for the corruptions in China, 
among which the first is an inner motivation while the other three are outer conditions. 
Similarly, Pan(2013)stresses the current deficiency of outlook of right and wrong and shortage 
of essential moral standards fail those officials to resist corruptions, but he does not discuss 
what leads to the shortages. Neither Zhang nor Pan has deepened his studies of what leads to 
the chaotic ideas insufficient restraints on power. 
The third category, however, takes a further step to focus on the historical interpretation on the 
root for mushrooming corruptions in both ancient and contemporary China. Hu and Li(2006:A4) 
observe the fact that patriarchal clan values and socialized institutions, by means of weaving 
various networks based on kinship and officialdom, lay a solid foundation for the reoccurring 
corruptions both in the ancient times and at the contemporary age. Cao(2015) points out that 
the corruption in ancient China roots in the prosperity of Sanwang Zhuyi(Kingism, kingcraftism 
and monarchical legalism) which leaves no room for democratic ideas like the Three Principles 
of the People blooming in ancient Rome Empire. In the meantime, Xu (2015) argues that “filial 
piety” is the origin of corruptions, by which current anti-corruption campaign is doomed to a 
failure. 
On the one hand, this category deepens the studies on corruptions roots; on the other, they still 
remain isolated from each other since none of them has have ever detected how the inner 
connection between Kingism, political Confucianism and patriarchal clans contributes to the 
corruptions to date.  
By integrating all the perspectives in the third category, therefore, the author attempts to 
discover how the spectre of the Trinity of Sanwang Zhuyi, political Confucianism and their 
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externalized patriarchal clans as social institutions generates the politic-ethical root for 
communitarian corruptions in contemporary China.  
2 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology in this paper involves two parts— establishing a politic-ethical perspective 
and following Foucault’s conceptual formation approach.  
2.1 A politic-ethical perspective  
Human being is defined ethically “just on account of its ability to follow its own retrospection, 
which separates human beings’ behaviors from those sheer physical, biological or instinctive 
ones in the natural world. With self-control mechanism, a man is able to handle its instinct so as 
not to damage the relationship with others, by which all community members co-exist.” (Gan, 
2013:24) 
The self-control ethic mechanism frames a man’s behaviors with two lines: the bottom-line of 
not doing bad in terms of self-restraint or self-abnegation, for instance, Ten Commandments 
warning people of ten don’ts while the top-line of doing good encouraging people to practice 
virtues such as benevolence, uprightness, propriety, sincerity and by respecting each 
individual’s life, health, wealth, family, freedom, equality, individuality and other basic human 
rights. 
An official is, first, a man of private morals in his private life. In public kingdom, the granted 
public power in hand is to amplify institutionally the integrity of his moralities and capabilities 
by enlarging his freedom, rights and duties. The higher an official’s position is, the greater an 
amplification effect will be, of course, in both good and bad senses. That’s why civil servants, 
besides more strict private ethics, must practice public ethics vigorously based on two 
principles—the utilitarian principle to maximize the public good and the liberal principle 
demanding “ that the promotion of the public good should not endanger or violate the 
protection of the rights of the individual members of a society.” (Hellsten and 
Larbi,2006:135–145) 
Without moral restraints, either private or public, an official is greatly likely to be driven by his 
greediness to abuse his power for greater personal gains. When necessary, various layers of 
officials may appeal to the superior to set up a solid network for communitarian corruptions. 
Whatever form a corruption may take, the agent of corruption must be a person (a group of 
people) with public power; the aim of corruption is for immoral and illegal personal gains; and 
the violated object is the public’s legal rights and the trust from between public and 
governmental institutions. 
In this sense, corruption is a politic-ethical matter.  
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2.2 Foucault’s conceptual formation approach  
Any actions are driven or motivated by certain desires or ideas, either individual or institutional. 
According to Foucault(1972:62), ideas might have a long history in an institution and thus 
construct an institutional “deductive architecture” without necessarily obeying “rigorous 
conditions” since “their history is not the stone-by-stone construction of an edifice” which, 
however, should not “be left in its apparent disorder” but be “seen as a succession of conceptual 
systems, each possessing its own organization, and being articulated against the permanence of 
problems, the continuity of tradition, or the mechanism of its influences.” Actually, a scholar 
should find a law “that would account for the successive or simultaneous emergence of 
disparate concepts,” “and have to describe the organization of the field of statements where 
they appeared and circulated.”(Foucault,1972:62) 
Following Foucault, the author will focus on the succession process consisting of various 
ordering of enunciative series, various types of dependence of the statements and various 
rhetorical schemata (Foucault,1972:63) co-existing in the configuration of the enunciative 
field(Foucault,1972:64), whose “procedures of intervention” may be interpreted in “techniques 
of writing”, “modes of translating” and “approximation of statements.” (Foucault,1972:65) 
To be specific, the author will first make a historical-socio-discursive investigation on how the 
coexisting Chinese traditional political values, ethic values and social values have been 
enunciated, translated and approximated, and how they intermingle with each other and 
construct a solid Trinity of Sanwang Zhuyi, political Confucianism and patriarchal clan system 
in which there is no counter-balance to corrupt power execution. Second, he will disclose with 
empirical evidence how this thousands-of-yeared mode fixates its spectres haunting 
contemporary China.  
3 STRUCTURING THE TRINITY OF SANWANG ZHUYI, POLITICAL 
CONFUCIANISM AND PATRIARCHAL CLANS IN ANCIENT CHINA 
Structuring a trinity edifice concerns the combination of Sanwang Zhuyi (Three Principles of 
Kingism), political Confucianism and patriarchal clans in ancient China, in which Sanwang 
Zhuyi drives the cart of patriarchal clans lubricated by political Confucian values centering 
around zhong and xiao.  
3.1 Sanwang Zhuyi demanding absolute obedience to the power in a state  
By comparing Three Principles of the People in ancient Rome, Cao(2015) gives a insightful 
investigation of Sanwang Zhuyi(Three Principles of Kingism) which dominates ancient China 
from Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties to Ming and Qing Dynasties.  
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The first principle of Wangdao Zhuyi is that the power of kings are divine because it is granted 
by the Heaven. It first stems from Zhuanxu’s disconnecting Heaven from Earth(juedi tiantong,
绝地天通), Emperor Yao and Emperor Shun’s concept that the power is given by heaven and 
should be followed by ordinary people, which lays a primitive foundation for the emperor’s 
legal administration.(Tian yu zhi, min shou zhi,天与之,民受之) And it grows into a legal idea 
that the emperor has the reason and power to punish those guilty in the name of Heaven(Tainfa 
Youzui, daitian xingfa,天罚有罪,代天行罚) in the Xia Dynasty and penalty from the Heaven in 
Shang Dynasty, which ascends into a systemic ideology consisting of respecting the Heaven to 
save the people(jingtian baomin,敬天保民), highlighting moralities and being prudent in 
penalties(mingde shenfa,明德慎罚) from the Son of Heaven.  
From Wangdao Zhuyi, the ideological source, stems the second Kingism(Wangquan Zhuyi) in 
the Qin and Han Dynasties, by which feudal kings and princes have the power to dominate both 
the enfeoffs and their attached people. Wangquan Zhuyi paves a political way for the third 
principle (Wangfa Zhuyi) that all the highest legislative, judicial and administrative power 
belongs to the king or emperor himself. 
Although Sanwang zhuyi was born four thousand years ago, according to Cao(2015), it keeps 
ideologically and legally booming until late Qing Dynasty and still implicitly active in the 
contemporary society, by which the state head tightly grasp the strongest power with the 
remains divided by various levels of officials while lower-class is too powerless to guard 
themselves, let alone constraining the powerful persecutions and corruptions. 
3.2 Patriarchal clan system demanding absolute obedience to the senior power  
To solidify the political structure of Sanwang Zhuyi, a patriarchal clan system is established 
based on the key ethic relations between king and minister, father and son, husband and wife, in 
which the first is just an analogically magnified circle to those in a family. According to Hu and 
Li(2006), this family-state isomorphism, on the one hand, constructs the orders of ancient 
Chinese social and political life; on the other, it expedites the birth of privileges and nepotism 
which soils various corruptions. Ideologically, various levels of officials regard themselves as 
parents of the working people, which is discursively mirrored in “parent officials”(fu mu guan,
父母官) and “child people”(zi min,子民) while serving their various superiors. Institutionally, 
various networks with different hierarchies are weaved based on how close or distant to “ME” 
in terms of kinships and geographic relations. Such an ideological and institutional combination 
creates a hotbed for corruptions.  
Specifically, Hu and Li(2006) argue that many officials do their best to weave three types of 
networks. The first is a pure official network for patron, protection and promotion. The second 
is an infinite kinship-friendship network for mutual political or economic benefits. The third is 
a network of various social resources rotating around officials. These invisible nets not only 
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shelter corrupt officials from relevant punishments but legalize and aggravate more severe 
corruptions.  
3.3 “Zhong” and “Xiao” justifying obedience to the power 
While establishing the patriarchal clan system dominated by Kingism, times has an eye on 
breeding an ethical lubricants to ensure the legalized edifice’s smooth running. Consequently, 
Confucius’ moral teachings, later translated adroitly by his followers in different dynasties, just 
meet their needs.  
Confucius’ idea of san da de (The Three Virtues, 三达德) includes ren (benevolence,仁), 
yi(righteousness,义 ) and consequently li(propriety, 礼 ). (The Doctrine of the Mean, in 
Legge,1992:41) Anyone who wants to be a jun zi (superior man 君子) must practice xiao(filial 
piety, 孝) and ti(fraternity,悌) in the form of wen (benignity,温), liang (uprightness,良), gong 
(courteousness,恭), jian (temperateness,俭) and rang (complaisantness,让). (Xue Er, The 
Confucian Analects, in Legge, 1992:67)  
Succeeding the concept of xiao, the Xiao Jing(Classic of Filial Piety) formally highlights the 
doctrine that filial piety is the most important of all virtues except zhong.  
It tries to elaborate the connotation and significance of filial piety by citing Confucius’ words 
whenever possible.(Deng,2012)For example, the introductory principle that filial piety is the 
root of all virtues arises from You Zi’s argument in Xueer, The Analects of Confucius that it is 
impossible for a filial person to disobey his superiors. 
While You Zi’s interpretation only stresses the effect of filial piety, according to Deng(2012), 
Xiao Jing formulates its mechanism which can be transcended from family to state, from filial 
piety to loyalty towards kings, from fraternity to obedience towards officials because xiao is 
man’s natural instinct by which children should be filial to their parents and ministers should be 
loyal to their kings. In short, filial piety is the way of Heaven, and the way of being a man.  
Dong Zhongshu translates it into wu chang (The Five Constant Virtues,五常) including ren 
(benevolence,仁), yi (righteousness,义), li (propriety,礼), zhi (wisdom,智) and xin (sincerity,信) 
within the frame of  san gang(The Three Cardinals,三纲) that ruler guides subject, father 
guides son and husband guides wife, which specifies Confucius’ xiao(filial piety) in a state or a 
family,(Dong Zhongshu, Chunqiu Fanlu). And it establishes the connotation “loyalty” by 
distinguishing the obedience between rulers and ministers and that between family members.  
In the North Song Dynasty, the principles evolved into ba duan (The Eight Virtues, 八端 )—
zhong(loyalty to the emperor), xin (sincerity), xiao(filial piety), ti (love and respect one's elder 
brother), li (propriety), yi (righteousness), lian (a sense of honour, 廉), and chi (a sense of 
shame,耻). (Chinese Encyclopedia Online)In the 1910s, Sun Yat-sen revised it into ba de (The 
Eight Virtues,八德) —loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, love, faithfulness, justice, peace and 
harmony. (Sun, 1978:65)  
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In the seemingly rich moral teachings, however, zhong always takes the first position. Liu(2012) 
points out the Confucian antinomy that when conflicting with each other, zhong is always 
superior to xiao. Logically, zhong marginalizes or even crushes other values into null. 
That is, all the values such as ren (benevolence), yi(righteousness) specified as wen (benignity), 
liang (uprightness), gong (courteousness), jian (temperateness), li(propriety),  
rang(complaisantness),love, faithfulness, justice, peace and harmony are marginalized by 
zhong(loyalty), xiao(filial piety), ti(fraternity) condensed in san gang(The Three Cardinals); so 
are xiao and ti by zhong. Therefore, such an ethics creates an unbalanced ethical hierarchy. The 
Chinese ethic history, as Gong(2014) argues, constructs a complete powerful top-down 
politic-ethical paradigm ruining Mencius’ benevolence requirement on the rulers that “(T)he 
people are the most important element in a nation; the spirits of the land and grain are the next; 
the sovereign is the lightest .” (Mencius: Jin Xin, Part II.  Legge,1992:541) 
3.4 Constructing the Trinity 
Along with various rhetorical schemata(appealing to the law of harmony between man and the 
Heaven), ancient Chinese elites have various ordering of enunciative series(The heaven 
dominates the Earth and Man so that the superior dominates the inferior ), various types of 
dependence of the statements(Sanwang Zhuyi, ideals of patriarchal clans, and concepts of 
zhong and xiao) co-existing in the configuration of the declarative field, whose “procedures of 
intervention” are well interpreted in “techniques of writing”(analogy), “modes of 
translating”(Homme de paille,for example, translating a family into a state, filial piety into 
loyalty) and “approximation of statements.” (adroitly turning Confucius’ Junjun Chenchen(A 
king should behave as a king, so should a minister as a minister) into Junwei 
Chengang( monarch is the outline for his subjects) ). 
All theses methods and efforts contribute to constructing the Trinity of Sanwang Zhuyi, 
patriarchal clan systems and politically-distorted Confucius ethics. That is, political Confucian 
ideals of zhong and xiao, together with other attached values establish the running mode of 
patriarchal clans in which the king/emperor’s power is the highest, that of officials, secondary, 
and that of the powerless, null. 
This ideological-political-institutional-cultural process for thousands of years greatly depresses, 
weakens or disables other traditional moral values and leaves a larger and larger loophole for 
power abuse. Although this Trinity’s legitimate institutional flame has been extinguished since 
1949, its schema still keeps active underneath everyday life ideologically, culturally and 
politically like spectres. 
4 SPECTRES HAUNTING THE CPC’S CADRES CONSTRUCTION AND 
MUSHROOMING CORRUPTIONS 
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So long saturated in Chinese culture, CPC’s practices in selecting cadres fail to escape from 
being subject to some significant Chinese traditional politic-ethical values however communist 
or Marxist it might claim to be. 
4.1 Spectres in the CPC’s selecting a cadre since 1949 
With various degrees of succession, translation and deviation from Chinese traditional values, 
the history of CPC’s moral requirement on selected cadres since 1949 undergoes three phases
—virtues -come- as-the-first- capabilities–second before the mid-1980s, capabilities-come- 
as-the-first-virtues-second from the mid-1980s to the early 21st Century, and 
traditional-virtues-returning phase since the year of 2006.(For details of the third phase, see 
Section 5)The first phase implicitly marginalizes Chinese traditional values such as 
li(propriety), yi(righteousness), lian(fairness and incorruptness) and chi(a sense of shame),etc. 
by only translating the concept of loyalty to emperor into that to the Party. To make it worse, 
the second phase almost deviates from any ethics. 
Virtues -come- as-the-first- capabilities -second phase 
This phase undergoes a conceptual variation in terms of liyi lianchi(Propriety, uprightness, 
sense of honor and sense of shame), youhong youzhuan (both red and expert) and decai 
jianbei(having both virtues and capabilities), during which traditional values except loyalty do 
not appear in written documents. 
The only chance for Mao Zedong to connect Chinese traditional ethics with the CPC’s ruling of 
the state occurred soon after the founding of People’s Republic of China. Mao, in an informal 
talk with his fellow-villagers, cites Guan Zi’s words to comment on how the CPC should 
govern officials. 
To govern a state, in nature, is to govern the officials. Propriety, uprightness, sense 
of honor and sense of shame are the four pillars to establish a state, without which a 
state is doomed to collapse. If all the ministers were in lack of the four dimensions, 
they would embezzle or do whatever they wish, which is certain to bring about great 
chaos. Kuomintang has had such a fate of collapse, so would the CPC.  (cited in 
Jia,2014)  
Later on, Mao Zedong (Gong, 2014) formally puts forward the policy of “appointing cadres in 
terms of virtues and capabilities”, in which virtues mainly means political attitudes, ideology 
and daily ethics and work style.  
A new term youhong youzhuan is put forth by Mao (1977) in 1957 to demand that all cadres 
should keep red as the color of the national flag rather than white, grey or pink in both ideology 
and political stands, and be a member of the Left rather than the Middle and the Right. In 1960, 
Hu Qili(2011) explains that “to be red ” means clinging to the belief of communism and 
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vindicating the people’s political system of socialist democracy. In 1980, Deng(1994:284-290) 
reiterates it in the central meeting of army reform. 
In August,1980, Deng(1994:326)presents a new standard of decai jianbei that officials should 
have ,first, political integrity and second, capability. “By political integrity, first and foremost, 
an official should stick to socialism and CPC’s leadership. Under this precondition, cadres 
should be younger, better-educated and more professionally competent.” In December,1980, 
Deng(1994:361) terms “political integrity” into ge ming hua (being revolutionary), which 
induces establishing si hua as the cardinal of selecting a cadre in the revised Party Constitution 
at the 12th National Congress of CPC. Ge ming hua, according to the new constitution, requires 
a cadre to adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles, advocate the Party’s basic lines, keep the 
same space with the Central Committee, not to abuse power for personal gains but serve the 
people whole-heartedly and be honest and upright in daily life, in which loyalty to the Party 
ranks the first while honesty and uprightness rank the sixth. (Deng,1994:361) 
In short, the evolution of CPC cadre ethical values from the 1950s to the early 1980s were more 
plutonomic than ethic, in which highlighting loyalty to the Party implicitly marginalizes other 
Chinese traditional moralities such as benevolence, uprightness, propriety, cleanness, sincerity 
and a sense of shame.  
Capabilities-come- as-the-first-virtues-second Phase 
If the requirement of de (political integrity) could somewhat restrain and regularize cadres’ 
behaviors before the age of reform, the fatal turning of capability-comes-the-first in selecting 
officials completely marginalizes ethical requirements so that more and more officials get to 
abuse their power for personal illegal benefits.  
Highlighting capability as the first regardless of their moral standards used to be popular in the 
Warring Period (480 BCE to 221 BCE) and Three Kingdoms Period (220AD-280AD), when 
ancient China in chaos called for more war talents. In the 1980s-1990s, this ghost haunts China 
having just narrowly escaped from the Great Cultural Revolution. At that time, the state under 
dramatic economic reform is so thirsty for knowledge and talents that it takes an extreme step.  
In the mid 1980s, People’s Daily launches a landmark discussion on the new ideals of talents. 
An editorial entitled “Be brave to select and employ those who dare to be innovative”(Page 1, 
1984/09/14) establishes the epochal standards for new type of talents: 1)Adhering to 
Marx-Leninism; 2)Being young with new knowledge, new technology, new ideas and new 
experience; 3)Being intensely ambitious, responsible and far-sighted; 4) Being able to follow 
the true and good. At the end of this editorial, interestingly, the author does not forget 
mentioning that people should be tolerant of those talents’ various defects.  
In contrast with that Si Hua Standard, the new standard has a drastic change: 
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1. “Adhering to Marx-Leninism” is replaced by “adhering to the Four Cardinal Principles, 
advocating the Party’s basic lines, keeping the same space with the Central Committee.” 
2. The new standard lays a great stress on the would-be cadre’s youth, energy, expertise, 
experience, responsibility, ambition and far-sightedness.  
3. “Being able to follow the true and good” is rather ambiguous since what is true and good 
may involve various parameters, which invites different interpretations. 
From February to May, 1985, a series of essays are published to further the details of that 
editorial in the People’s Daily. They are Don’t be too “demanding” on prodigies(Page 8, 
Feb.7), Too perfect to be true(Page 8, Feb.13), Select both young and old talents(Page 8, 
Feb.13), No set form for selecting a talent(Page 3, Feb.13), Invigorate the way of 
selecting the talents(Page 1, Feb.16), An essay of spring(Page 4, Feb.22), Say goodbye to 
the past and welcome the new year (Page 8, Mar.17),Be bold to employ talents with 
errors(Page 8, Mar.19), Unnecessary to select a cadre on better votes(Page 8, 
Mar.21),Times changes(Page 8, Mar.25), Reform and open policy calling for rapid 
growth of talents(Page 8, April 9),and Fearless of gossips in selecting a talent.(Page 3, 
May 19) 
Not surprisingly, another editorial titled Don’t be obstructed in selecting a cadre (Page 2, July 
9,1985) in the People’s Daily makes a subtle but historic tuning, in which “being in one’s 
prime of life” ranks the first, followed by “being somewhat knowledgeable”, “having moral 
integrity” and “ being innovative.” 
These imperative essays steer the whole Party to a new but wrong direction. They criticize the 
old principles’ laying too much demand on a cadre’s personal integrity and too little on his 
reform capability. At the same time, they pray for new standards of hiring a capable person 
even though he is morally sullied. 
From then on, this poisonous thirst quenching sees a sheer economic- political metamorphosis 
in which requirement on capability of making money totally replaces the priority of adhering to 
the Four Cardinals both in media propaganda and in the state administration.  
These two historical conceptual metamorphoses, consequently, lead the CPC farther and father 
away from other Chinese traditional values except the translated loyalty, which creates new 
personal attachment to power.  
4.2Formation of personal attachment to power and relevant corruptions 
Theoretically, it is understandable for CPC to make some requirements on cadres’ political 
integrity to be hong(red) or ge ming hua (revolutionary) characterized by adhering to the Four 
Cardinal Principles(socialist road,  (proletarian )people ’ s democratic dictatorship, the 
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leadership of CPC, and Marxism and Mao Zedong Thoughts), keeping the same space with the 
Central Committee, not abusing power for personal gains but serving the people 
whole-heartedly and being honest and upright in daily life.  
However, five parameters to these requirements call forth attention: 
a. If a cadre fulfills all the requirements as to be loyal to both the Party and the people, he is 
regarded as a qualified Party member and might be highly praised; 
b. If a cadre can only be loyal to the Party instead of the people, no clear regularities are 
listed to restrain his misconduct; 
c. If a cadre can only be loyal to the people instead of the Party, it would be highly possible 
for him to be expelled; 
d. If a cadre can be loyal to neither the Party nor the people, he would be punished first in 
terms of the Party’s disciplines, and might be punished legally; 
e. If some cadres distort the loyalty to the Party into that to a particular powerful person, the 
damages to the Party, the state and the people are inevitable. Historically, the consequences are 
characterized by corruptions, power conflicts and social disorders since the establishment of 
CPC, for which the Party has failed finding a remedy. 
Practically, the mechanism of CPC’s selecting a cadre, in which the individual power rather 
than democracy has the last word, gives birth to personal attachment to individual power. When 
selecting officials, for example, those CPC County Committee Secretaries lay the greatest 
emphasis on loyalty to the Party and to the superior Party organization. In daily practice, the 
former is concretized into the loyalty to the key superior leaders. (Zhou ,2015) 
The first typical example is an extreme polarized loyalty to the mighty individual, Mao Zedong, 
at whose age virtues of benevolence, uprightness, propriety, sincerity and a sense of shame are 
deeply buried and large scale of political corruptions committed by the Gang Four who violated 
thousands upon thousands of victims’ human rights. The second is the loyalty to newly arising 
political oligarchies in various circles, where both traditional virtues and CPC’s moral 
standards are so ignored that numerous officials try to appear upright in words while abusing 
power for personal gain including higher positions, more wealth and extramarital sex in action. 
(Liu, 2013) These loyalties, despite of different ages, share the same nature—officials’ personal 
attachment to power. 
Blind worship of Mao  
The personal blind worship to Mao involves many factors such as Mao’s personal need since 
1958, some officials’ evil employment and survivals of feudalism, as Deng Xiaoping criticizesd. 
(Dong, 2011) In the author’s eyes, distorting loyalty to the CPC should be one of the most 
important. 
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Despite of Marxist opposition to extreme individualism in the history, a firm loyalty to the 
Party turns into blind worshiping Mao Zedong, the almighty head of CPC. It walks so far that 
even if the Great Cultural Revolution has come to its end and Mao has been dead for two years, 
the Central Committee still urges all the Chinese to follow the Principle of “Two Whatevers,” 
that is, “whatever decisions Chairman Mao has made, we must advocate; whatever instructions 
Chairman Mao has fixed, we must follow.” (People’s Daily, Feb.7,1977)  
The Age of Mao sees both numerous cases of individual power abuse1 at different phases and 
above all, communitarian political corruptions.  
First, worshippers of higher officials enjoyed special provisions with daily usages as well as 
personal secretaries, bodyguards, drivers, housemaids, cooks, doctors and houses, which 
symbolized the commencement of a special class with various privileges.(Huang, 2012) A 
sharp contrast could be seen between the starvation of the peasants and the special provisions to 
higher officials and senior intellectuals.( Zheng, 2011:20) 
Second, the “Gang of Four” (Si ren bang, 四人帮 ) —  Jiang Qing(Mao Zedong's 
wife ) ,  Zhang Chunqiao(the Shanghai Propaganda Department official ), Yao 
Wenyuan(literary critic)  and Wang Hongwen(the Shanghai security guard ) rose to power 
during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and committed severe political corruptions. Under 
the flag of loyalty to Chairman Mao, they, openly or secretly, took every means to persecute 
national leaders, CPC’s leaders and those of democratic parties, to suppress and persecute a 
large scale of cadres, intellectuals and other citizens at various levels and to have menaced the 
victims’ basic human rights. In a word, their ten-yeared power abuse had great havocs with 
Chinese people’s democratic dictatorship, social orders, national economy and other causes, 
which brought a calamity to the new China.(Supreme Court,1981) 
                                                        
1 Soon after the foundation of New China, officials’ grafting scattered here and there. According to Gao 
Gang(1951:203-205),Secretary of Northeastern Bureau, “in the second half of the year of 1949, the number of 
grafting amounted to 5.3% of all criminal cases; in 1950, 5.7%; in the first quarter of 1951,13.2%.” Similarly, 
according to Xi Zhongxun(1952:1-2), Secretary of Northwestern Bureau, “In Tianshui Special Zone, more than 30 
percent of officials committed corruptions.” 
From 1958 to 1962 when numerous people died of starvation, some officials took advantage of their power to 
violate other’s human rights by scolding, beating(sometimes to death), caging, confiscation, humiliation, cadaver 
exhumation(Wei,1992; Han, 2012:50; Zhou, 2004:145-148 ; Jian & Zhou, 1993 :132) And some officials grafted 
public grains for their own families.(Liu, 2010:1177-1188) 
Moreover, corruptions frequently occurred concerning educated urban youth who worked and settled in the 
countryside in the 1960’s and 1970’s.On the one hand, many higher officials tried their best to send them to the 
army to keep their own children from working and settling in rough countryside; (Huang, 2012)on the other, 
sexual corruptions were often seen in those officials with the power to authorize the fate of those educated urban 
youth who worked and settled in the countryside in the 1960’s and 1970’s. According to Ding(2006), more than 
3,400 seducing and raping cases happened in Liaoning Province from 1968 to 1973, and 3,296 in Sichuan 
Province. More detailed data can be found in Xin(2014). 
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Although the “Gang of Four” has been smashed, the historical climate in which an official 
takes advantage of various levels of power paves the way for officials’ breeding new worship 
of newly arising oligarchies and weave various solid guan xi (network) at the age of reform. 
Fluctuating worship of newly arising oligarchies 
In contrast with the dogmatic worship of Mao which is not easy to be converted, the worship of 
newly arising oligarchies is quite fluctuating because what a corrupt official really pursues is 
not the oligarchy’s personal charisma but his added value, namely, the potential benefit that the 
worshipper might get. Three factors, in the author’s eyes, contribute to the worship of power 
and guan xi centering round newly arising oligarchies: 
In the 1980s, more and more Chinese from grass roots to higher officials begin to reexamine 
the blind worship for Mao who launches the Great Cultural Revolution in which hundreds and 
thousands of cadres, intellectuals lose their freedom or lives. With the collapse of worship to 
Mao, new personal political idol remains vacant for 30 years while loyalty to the power is still 
there.  
Secondly, there is little room for western values to be spread in the 1980s. On the one hand, 
Deng Xiaoping stresses the significance of distinguishing Mao Zedong Thoughts from Mao’s 
own blunders in his late years so as to delete the blind worship for Mao; (China.Org.cn, 1980) 
on the other, Deng keeps highly alert on fighting against bourgeois liberalization and the 
academic spreading of Western thoughts did dwindle since the 1990s.   
Thirdly, the fatal turning from ethics-comes-first to capability-comes-first aggravates new 
worships at the age when no strict moral, political, legal punishments come to the stage. 
4.4 Oligarchy worship and communitarian corruptions 
The shift from worship of Mao’s almightiness to that of power at various levels rockets to the 
sky in the early 21st Century. With no ethical top line(virtues) to pursue, no bottom line (basic 
moral standards)to stick to, no strict disciplines and laws to fear but superior power to obey, 
corrupt officials are strongly motivated by seeking for wealth and sex.  
Consequently, officials concerned appeal to various guan xi , to borrow Hellsten and Larbi’s 
words, (2006:135-145) in order to weave “communitarian solidarity-networks for the common 
good of their particular social collectives rather than the national public good.” Since the 1990s, 
such underground communitarian solidarity-networks mushroom in the circles of family 
members or kinships, officials and businessmen.  
The first type is circles of clans. According to Yang(2014),more than 60 percent of corruptions 
involve officials’ family members such as the Zhous(Yongkang), the Xus(Caihou), the Sus 
(Rong) and the Lings(Jihua) .(Lin, 2014 )  
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The second is weaved by officials and businessmen. On the one hand, half of the investigated 
higher officials are corrupted by real estate businessmen, among whom 30 provincial-level 
officials have been punished since the 18th National Congress of CPC. (Liu, 2014) On the other 
hand, some businessmen bribe for political capital and get intermingled with governmental 
officials. For example, Liu Han and Liu Wei in Sichuan Province leading 36 gangsters and 
officials committed 15 criminal cases, in which three judicial officials (two section-level 
police-officers and one section-level prosecutor) offered them political protections as well as 
bullets and arms. To accumulate more wealth, Liu Han bribed some high officials to take three 
sessions of member of Sichuan Provincial Committee of CPPCC, member of the Standing 
Committee of Sichuan Provincial Committee of CPPCC. (Zhang J.,2014)  
The third type of circles involves a gang of corrupted officials who center round an oligarchy at 
various levels. According to Yang(2014), 15 bureau-level cadres, 19 section-level and 13 
office-level cadres are engaged in Luo Yunguang(former vice Minister of Railways) Bribery 
Case in 1990; over 30 per cent of provincial-level corrupt officials investigated since 18th CPC 
National Congress of CPC erect political allies and economic conglomerations. For instance, 
the Sichuan Corruption Case involves Li Chuncheng(former Vice Secretary  of Sichuan 
Provincial Party Committee ),Guo Yongxiang(former Vice Chairman of the Literary Federation 
of Sichuan), Li Chongxi(former Chairman of Political Consultative Conference in Sichuan ), Ji 
Wenlin(former Vice Governor of Hainan ), Tan Li(former Vice Governor of Hainan), all of 
whom are connected with Zhou Yongkang to some degree. And the Shanxi Corruption Case 
centering round Ling Jihua enlists Jin Daoming(former Deputy Director, Shanxi People's 
Congress Standing Committee), Du Shanxue(former Vice Governor), Ling Zhengce(former 
Vice Chairman of Political Consultative Conference), Nie Chunyu(former Secretary General , 
Shanxi Provincial Party Committee), Chen Chuanping(former Member of Standing Committee 
of Shanxi CPC, Secretary of Taiyuan ), Ren Runhou(former Vice Governor), Bai Yun(former 
Member of Standing Committee of Shanxi CPC, Director of United Front Work Department 
of Shanxi Province)and Shen Weichen(former Secretary of Party Committee of 
China Association for Science and Technology).  
 These circles, as Xi(2014:764)criticizes, practice bossism by personal attachment and erect a 
hierarchy according to their official positions. Consequently, the loyalty to the Party is replaced 
by that to the most powerful guru like the relation between ministers and the emperor, sons and 
the father in the ancient feudalist China. Moreover, 
(T)hese circles have the power as their cores, business gurus and cahoots as their radii, in which 
“big brothers” instead of “comrades” are frequent remarks of their relationships. Those 
involved in such circles have no common beliefs, no principles of CPC, no laws and 
regularities only to construct cliques based on how powerful a person is. Various powers unite 
together for special allied interests so as to desalinate the tenet of serving the people, which 
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excavates tunnels for transporting special interests and sows the seeds for corruption. (Huang 
Y. ,2014)    
In summary, the polarization of loyalty leads to personal attachment to stronger power brings 
forth values subject to the superior’s personal will and lays a basis for power abuse, on account 
of which more and more people come to believe in power for personal benefit rather than other 
traditional virtues considerate of other’s interests. In addition, the historic inverting the order of 
ethics and capabilities aggravates power abuse to an extreme degree.  
5 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Based on Foucault’s conceptual formation approach,  the author makes a historical survey of 
the conceptual and practical relationship between Chinese traditional ethics and CPC’s cadre 
moral requirements and finds that although CPC tries its best to substitute Marxism for 
feudalism, it fails to suffocate the morphologically mutant succession of the Trinity of Sanwang 
Zhuyi, patriarchal clan ideals and political Confucian ideas centering around zhong and xiao, 
which is highly possible for some officials’ loyalty to the Party to metamorphose into personal 
attachment to a super power or political oligarchies inducing bossism and solid networks for 
communitarian corruptions on a large scale.  
Facing more and more severe communitarian corruptions, both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping 
attempt to reestablish official moralities as the priority over capability by transforming Chinese 
traditional ethics into the socialist. Hu(2006) puts forward “barong bachi” (eight honors and 
eight shames)as the socialist outlook of honor and disgrace, according to which it is a great 
virtue to love the motherland (zhong), serve the people(gong and ren), uphold science, work 
hard(lian), work in unity and cooperation(wen, rang and he), obey the law and make a plain 
living(jian) while it is a sheer shame (chi) to do the opposite. And the new government led by 
Xi, along with tougher tactical measures to deter corrupt officials by intense tiger-flies-hunting, 
(Lin,2014 ) resolves to renew official ethics strategically by translating traditional values in 
contemporary words. A qualified cadre, according to Xi(Gong, 2014) , should be “firm in 
political belief (zhong), willing to serve the people(ren and gong), devoted(gong) and 
practical(cheng), brave for responsibility(gong), and clean and clear in his position(lian),”  
“strict in self-cultivation(xiushen) and using power, self-restriction(xiushen), be practical 
(cheng)in planning, starting a business and honest as a man.”  
Hu’s and Xi’s transformation are theoretically developed by earnest calls for the returning of 
Chinese traditional ethics. Lin (2014) argues that most punished officials have ethic deficiency 
in their public and private moralities, in which the former means that a Party member should be 
loyal to the Party and serve the people whole-heartedly; the latter refers to the official’s 
self-cultivation, which constructs a very good interface between public and private moralities 
by turning a family into a state, in which a family is the miniature of a state and a state is the 
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enlarged family. And Chen (2015:7) argues more concretely that Chinese traditional values, 
compared with Western ethics, stress more on responsibilities than freedom, duties than rights, 
collectivity than individuality, and harmony than conflict. The interests of families, clans, states 
are much more important than that of an individual person. In short, contemporary China 
should adopt Chinese traditional ethics characterized by loyalty and obedience as the top 
priority rather than the Western highlighted by freedom, rights and individuality. 
However promising these efforts might be, in the eyes of the author, new oligarchy worship 
would frequently steps onto the 21st C stage if the national leaders failed to notice or refused to 
acknowledge the following two aspects. 
Firstly, Chinese traditional ethics centering around loyalty and filial piety leaves a large 
loophole for a community head to violate an individual’s rights at his own will in the name of 
justice, particularly, in that of protecting the interests of families, clans, communities and states, 
which has been witnessed so frequently. An insular appeal to Confucian ethics to govern the 
state, clearly, is doomed to a failure. 
Secondly, moralities appear so weak as to be parasitic on the charming, nutritious, protective, 
sometimes, destructive power. Therefore, what must be done to guarantee the role of ethics in 
state-governing is to convert the channel by which the power is granted to a person. To be more 
specific, the cadre generation mechanism must be converted from relying on a particular 
powerful person to depending on the powerful public, both theoretically and practically. Only 
the power is really of the people, by the people and for the people, may both private and public 
ethics maximize their contribution to the benign growth of Chinese nationality so that most 
officials not only dare not but will not commit corruptions. Elected or selected, that is a 
question. 
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